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 The ascent to power by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 was a 
period of great turmoil and confusion.  Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Party and the 
head of government emerged as a powerful and willful dictator, and intellectually the 
chief strategist in determining China's future and what it would become.  In the midst 
of this turmoil, Mao knew that one thing was certain:  the population of the country 
would rise, and the increase would be large enough and swift enough that it would 
overwhelm the economy and the government.  The national economy, even before WW 
II had left China deeply in poverty, underdeveloped, illiterate, and without direction or 
hope.  All of this was made worse by the Japanese invasion and later the internal civil 
war.  When the Communists won, few could conceive of them leading China to any 
bright new future. 
 But for Mao, one other thing was also certain: that the Communist Party and the 
theology of State Socialism could and would do exactly that.  Mao saw the world in 
revolutionary terms, where the Great Revolution of Communism would sweep aside 
the old structures and the old ideas and the old leadership in favor of a militant new 
leadership with all the answers who would lead China to greatness. 
 The issue of population growth would be dealt with.  Under the CCP, the answer 
was that the government itself would take control of the economy, own its productive 
resources, capture its profits and produce a Socialist paradise for China's citizens.  Their 
needs would all be met by the government "from the cradle to the grave".  And it was 
Mao's view that population growth was in fact a great strength to be utilized, and not a 
threat to be prevented.  He envisioned a great surge of dedicated farmers and builders, 
factory hands and soldiers, all contributing to the glories of the new Socialist economy. 
But Mao and the Party ultimately failed totally and disastrously in meeting even 
the basic needs of the great majority of the Chinese people, and instead, provided them 
with poverty, starvation and war.  In economic terms, the CCP had staked the economic 
future of the country on a Soviet style centrist planned economy, with almost total 
reliance on a huge number of State Owned Enterprises, but in the end, they proved 
capable of providing adequate employment for only about 20% of the workforce.  Thus, 
when Mao died in 1976, he left the country saddled with these State Owned Enterprises, 
50% or more of which were operating at a deficit.(1) The country remained mired in 
poverty, with most of the population still locked into rural/small town lives that could 
not be made anything but marginal.  China still lacked even the basics of social services 
and most kinds of public infrastructure. 
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 But Mao's death allowed his successors to begin a second revolution of their 
own.  The CCP began, belatedly, to clean up Mao's mess and to design a whole new 
course of action for the future.  The old concepts of the triumph of the workers and the 
peasants, and the creation of a classless society were mythological, and the country then 
and now is run by a small ruling elite.  But the public seems content to rely on the CCP, 
even with its horrible track record, because there seemed to be no alternative, since the 
CCP had been diligent in preventing all opposition or even dissenting opinion.  So the 
Party properly chose to ignore its own history and work hard to establish itself as the 
new "heroes" of national reform.  The CCP has had to abandon the Maoist legacy, 
redesign the economy, reform the government itself, and manage the consequences of 
these reforms for the Chinese people and society.  This has been a "second Revolution", 
and it has proved more positive and constructive than the first.  
 The whole extensive apparatus of state control of prices, production controls, 
worker job assignments and movement control, the allocation of resources, control of 
banking lending, import and export controls has been largely abandoned and 80% or 
more of the economy now operates with relative freedom in the new market based 
economy. 
 The great and dominating reality in China today remains its population of 1.3 
billion people, 50% of whom still remain in the rural/village/small town environment.  
When the nature of the workforce is examined, it reveals an enormous "float" of people 
who are unemployed, underemployed, working in erratic transient and seasonal jobs, 
or working as part of the illegal informal economy.  The CCP greatly feared the likely 
prospect of huge numbers in this "float" migrating to the cities which were often bad 
places to live, but anything was seen as better than starving on the farm.  The CCP 
knew that the cities could seldom provide services and infrastructure for its current 
residents and they would have been totally unable to handle a major migrant influx in 
any way.  The basic policy of the government therefore was to try and freeze the 
population as much as possible in their current locations, giving the government time to 
plan out when and under what circumstances the population would be allowed to shift.  
Basically it was hoped that, as the economy was expanded, new workers would indeed 
be required, and the government would carefully control the relocation of workers to 
meet these needs.  But in truth, the government ended up abandoning the whole 
Central Plan system because it did not work and had distorted reality and inhibited 
economic initiative. Therefore, the government really did not know where and at what 
pace specific elements of the economy would expand.  So in 1979, the government 
decided vigorously to reemphasize a 1950s program known as the Household 
Registration System.  Under this system, every Chinese citizen was registered at the 
place of his/her birth and each was then "official" at that place, unless a change was 
authorized by the government.  The point is that, whatever rights or services or 
entitlements were available to that citizen, they were available only at the official place 
of registration, and nowhere else.  Thus, if a man chose to leave his farm or village and 
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go to some city to find work, he would have no rights, nor be eligible for any services in 
that city. 
 Again, the main purpose of the Household Registration System was population 
management.  It was a strong bureaucratic way for a government official to prevent 
people from moving around the country in ways that the government was not prepared 
to handle.  Specifically, the system was aimed at preventing an uncontrolled flood of job 
seekers inundating cities totally unprepared to cope with them.  Official residents of 
cities were eligible for some level of assistance in housing, primary education, health 
care and pensions.  The unofficial migrant would not be entitled to any of these 
services, and they might also be denied a chance at "official" jobs, or may be harassed by 
the police for being "illegal". 
 But the system has largely failed.  China now has 230 million migrant people. (2) 
Migrants have always flooded to the main cities, despite efforts to enhance the 
economies in rural areas, and the substantial development of enterprises in townships 
and the larger villages.  These township and village enterprises (TVEs) emerged to 
replace the communes and collectives of the old style.  TVEs are often government run 
collectives; some were converted SOEs that had been dumped on local governments by 
the national government which was frankly motivated by the desire to get rid of "loser" 
enterprises which it could never seem to get to work.  It was the hope that an increase in 
local job opportunities would lessen the flow of migrants.  In addition, the government 
gracelessly allowed small concessions in the application of the law.  It now allows the 
issuance of temporary residence permits so that migrants have some added measure of 
job-seeking mobility, but of course, control is maintained by requiring these temporary 
permits to be renewed monthly with the police.  Nor do these temporary permits entitle 
the holders to any new access to urban social services, which is why up to 85% of the 
migrants leave their children at home.  Some cities like Shenzhen and Shanghai have 
begun to offer new basic welfare insurance policies for migrant workers covering 
accidents and a few elements of basic health care.  But employers, operating on razor 
thin profit margins are very reluctant to sign up for such plans.  In fact, there is great 
concern that any improvement in the lives of migrants simply translates into more 
migrants.  Three-quarters of the migrants work seven days a week; two thirds work 
more than eight hours per day, and 15-20% work more than 12 hours per day.  Working 
conditions are uniformly bad, and are significantly worse for the young women who 
tend machines, are paid a pittance, and live in miserable barracks. 
 Despite these conditions, and the millions of people who still flock to the cities, 
rural/village areas are still awash with unemployed and underemployed people facing 
a grim future.  TVE industry has also been very unevenly distributed.  Less than 3% is 
in the underdeveloped northwest of the country where the rural population still 
exceeds 80%. 
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 But in May of 2012, China's government announced that, for the first time in its 
history, more than 50% of the population now lives, officially or unofficially in cities. It 
seems clear that the best way --  perhaps the only way – to solve the problems of rural 
underemployment and urban migration is to accept the fact that rural workers have to 
be allowed to migrate to the cities and towns.  The rural workforce still contains an 
estimated 150-200 million surplus workers, and no amount of "rural assistance" is going 
to dent this enormous fact.  The government's attitudes must be changed to one of 
assistance to migrants to find jobs, rather than punishing them as illegals.  They must be 
offered at least limited access to social services, especially health care.  The government 
has begun to accept this line of thinking.  In 2002 and 2003, new policy documents have 
been issued to redress some of this unfairness and accord equal treatment to migrant 
workers in most urban settings.  Some of the money being spent on building opulent 
new apartments and office buildings has been shifted into a major program of housing 
more within the financial capabilities of migrant families. But as usual in China, these 
policy documents are not worth the paper they are written on unless the leadership in 
cities face up to reality and act more vigorously to meet the needs of their "floating 
population". 
 So now to return to 1979 and the great policy decisions of the new post-Mao 
regime, the third great policy decision, enacted in 1979, became known as the "one child 
policy".  In 1949, the population of China was about 450 million people.  By 1953, it had 
risen to about 580 million, by 1964 it was 695 million, and by 1979 it had reached more 
than 800 million.  Population projections of the time were stratospheric, forecasting a 
peak of 1.5 billion by 2035 (in fact, by 2010 it had already reached 1.3 billion).  In 
addition, the growth of the elderly population was equally ominous in policy terms.  In 
2000, the population of people over 65 was estimated as about 88 million, or 7% of the 
population.  By 2010, that number was 108 million; estimates for 2020 were for 159 
million and by 2045, it would peak at 300 million or more than 20% of the population at 
that time. At the same time, the dependency ratio of retirees to active workers would 
climb from just over 10% to more than 33%. 
So the decision was made to create and enforce a tough new policy of population 
control, where the intent was, by various means, to limit family size to only one child.  
The CCP has devised a broad program of population control of which the one child 
policy is but one facet.  The broader program has four main objectives: 
 1.  To control population growth on the assumption that, while the economy 
would grow under CCP leadership, it would not grow fast enough to deal with 
population increases, much less permit improvements in the living standards of the 
whole population. 
 2.  To lock the population into living where they were born, except where the 
government itself wants to shift people.  The main tool of this policy is the Household 
Registration System. 
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 3.  To impose the one child policy by urging, if not actually mandating that most 
parents have only one child. 
 4.  To reinforce the one child policy by pressing the use of population limiting 
practices such as abstinence, contraception and deferred marriages.   
 In the time frame between 1979, when the one child element of the policy was 
initiated, until 2001, it became obvious that, despite official claims that the policy has 
prevented more than 300 million births (3), the government had not succeeded in 
adequately limiting the number of births, nor in stemming the tide of job seekers from 
the farms and villages to the larger cities, and the CCP faced some decisions with 
respect to its population control program.  One such decision, made in 2001, was in fact 
to continue the one child policy despite human rights kinds of concerns.  Therefore, in 
December of 2001, Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China, formally 
issued Order #63, (4) the "Population and Family Planning Law of the Peoples Republic 
of China", as earlier approved by the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress.  
 In its usual fashion, the CCP never mentions population control and speaks only 
of population planning and development.  Nor does this "one child" law ever mandate 
the one child limit.  Instead, it states only that "the State maintains its current policy for 
reproduction, encouraging late marriage and childbearing, and advocating one child 
per couple." 
 The government linked family planning with the prospects of more 
opportunities for women, including increases in employment opportunities and better 
education, and it promises improvements in social services to carry out the program.  
The Order states that the government "may not infringe upon legitimate rights and 
interests of citizens."  In essence, the law was artfully crafted to make bland promises 
for some better life while carefully avoiding any language about government control, 
human denial, or enforcement. 
 While the national State Council, the governing body of the CCP, is stated as the 
supervisor of the one child policy, its implementation is assigned to everybody else.  
Program implementation is delegated down to local levels of government, with the CCP 
role largely confined to "policy".  This is the common pattern in China; such delegations 
are made for most complex and expensive social programs (health care, primary 
education, pensions, environmental protection) and they are made as "unfunded 
mandates", meaning that responsibility is not accompanied by any substantial funding 
from the national government level.  Where funding is provided, it tends to be in the 
form of small categorical grants through several ministries, always totally inadequate, 
and notoriously seen as ways to reward friends and punish dissidents.  
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 In addition, Order #63 specifically mandates not only the responsibilities of 
parents, but of all other elements in the country.  All government departments, public 
organizations, schools, hospitals, the armed forces, village committees, resident 
committees, and public service organizations are expected to "make a success of family 
planning programs."  In addition, departments in charge of education, science, 
technology, culture, public health, civil affairs, the press, publications, radio and TV 
broadcasting, and even such organizations as trade unions, professional associations, 
Women's Federations and Youth Leagues "shall assist the people's governments in 
carrying out these programs and make arrangements to conduct public education in the 
importance of the population program and family planning.  In the case of migrants to 
cities, family planning is supposedly shared by "the place where the residence is 
registered and the place where they are currently living, but chiefly by the latter." 
 Aside from the objective of population control, the one child only policy is 
justified by vague references to the prospect of better health services, better maternal 
and child care, greater opportunities for women, and enhancement of the "general 
quality" of the population, a phrase that never seems to have been made clear. The 
apparent presumption seems to have been that money for such social services is a fixed 
"zero sum" game, and if there are fewer people, the level of service for the rest can be 
upgraded.  The only promise within Order #63 about government social services 
financing is for funds directly supplied to families participating in the program.  This 
can come either in the form of some reward for participation or it can be benefits such 
as maternity leave, subsidies during pregnancy, birth delivery assistance, or family 
planning "surgical operations".  The State is supposed to provide technical services of 
various kinds, but the whole health care system continues to be marginal. 
 Several things are specifically prohibited under the Order.  First and foremost, it 
is illegal to "perform an operation related to family planning".  It is also illegal to "use 
ultrasonography or other techniques to identify fetal gender, or to bring about sex-
selective pregnancy termination for non-medical purposes." Local officials are guilty of 
crimes if they: 
 1.  Infringe on a citizen's personal rights, property rights, or other legitimate 
rights and interests. 
 2.  Abuse their power, neglect their duties, or engage in malpractice for personal 
gain. 
 3.  Demand or accept bribes. 
 4.  Withhold, misappropriate or embezzle funds for family planning and social 
maintenance fees. 
 5.  Tamper with or issue false statistical data. 
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 Since the administration of family planning is delegated to local officials, the 
interpretation of Order #63 and related regulatory provisions has created variations 
from place to place and enforcement is often impacted by local politics or finances.  The 
whole system tends to be closely monitored by local offices of the CCP which are thick 
on the ground and very powerful.  An appeals process is mandated in the Order, but it 
deals with redresses against administrative processes only, and does not extend to 
policy or financing levels.   
 Order #63 clearly signaled the intent of the CCP to continue the one child policy.  
The seriousness of this commitment is reflected in the nature of its enforcement.  A 
huge bureaucracy has been created to enforce it in ways that go far beyond "advocacy".  
It is impossible to estimate the number of government officials, SOE officers, urban 
committees, staff of schools and hospitals, civic groups, and even private companies 
who are employed to deploy and support one child programs and related services. The 
program is directed by the National Population and Family Planning Commission 
which has at least 300 thousand full time paid family planning workers. (5)  One study 
(6) estimated that there were at least 400,000 employees just at the township level, and 
as many as one million more in China's villages.  In total, it is estimated that up to 80 
million volunteers or assigned staffers are involved in pursuing the program.  Many of 
these volunteers are highly unpopular because they act like neighborhood spies –nosy, 
pushy, and willing to "rat out" their neighbors.  Cities are full of street committees, or 
neighborhood committees which pry into reported or potential violations. Various 
sources including some official ones reveal thousands and thousands of punishments 
and abuses.  Official penalties, legally applied, can include heavy fines (up to several 
times worker average annual incomes), removal from jobs, loss of social service 
benefits, and even imprisonment.  Far more disturbing are the reports of forced 
abortions, forced sterilization, and even infanticide. In addition, there are countless 
reported cases of official abuse and illegalities including the use of hired thugs to attack 
violators. 
 Inherent in this pattern is the nature of the enforcing bureaucracy.  The CCP 
remarkably retains a high level of control over the appointment, promotion, transfer 
and removal of local government officials, down two or three layers.  Those officials in 
charge of population control and one child enforcement are assigned quotas setting 
allowable limits on population growth and compliance with one child limitations, and 
the need to obey is deeply ingrained in the hearts and minds of subordinate officials.  
Failure to meet these quotas can have devastating consequences on careers.  Those who 
fail may lose any prospect for future advancement, or may be transferred or fired.  The 
effect of this kind of pressure has led to desperate and often vicious measures to meet 
quotas – measures that may be illegal, immoral, brutal and corrupt.  Such measures 
must then be carefully concealed.  China is afloat the thousands of revelations about 
individual personal outrages including threats, beatings, false arrests, firings, as well as 
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forced abortions and sterilizations.  The CCP blandly coasts by these revelations, or 
blames everything it cannot dodge on local government misconduct. 
 As it emerged, it became apparent that the one child policy had been designed to 
be limited in its application to the point that it is really officially applicable to only 
about 36% of the population.  It is strictly applied to married urban couples, but those in 
the new middle class can afford the relatively minor penalties imposed for second or 
third children.  The law has waivers for ethnic minorities such as the Tibetans or the 
Muslims in Xinjiang Province, and waivers are also granted for the Special 
Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau. 
 Over the years since 2001, the government has slowly and reluctantly allowed 
some relaxation of control by local governments in the one child program.  In instances 
where a first child is a girl, parents may be allowed to try for a second child, hoping it 
will be a boy.  Where both parents are only children themselves, and may face the 
prospect of having to care for up to four of their own parents, they may be allowed a 
second child.  Special rules have been developed for a disabled child, or for very poor 
parents, or for ethnic minorities.  Because a lot of latitude is allowed in rural and village 
jurisdictions, many have authorized two children or even three if the first two are girls. 
And even though the use of ultrasound equipment is officially illegal, portable 
ultrasound units seem readily available in rural and village environments, thus 
enabling gender-biased abortions. And beyond these official relaxations, two other 
great Chinese skills are at work – lying and cheating.  The cheating is usually by parents 
who ignore the law and feel that they can produce an extra child or two without 
officials finding out, or that they can bribe their way out of punishment.  Officials may 
well be perfectly willing to accept such bribes, since they believe they can lie in the 
formal compliance reports submitted up the chain of command.  In addition, the 
relaxation of movement controls now allows people to move around the country, 
usually seeking jobs.  This means that it has become far easier for families to evade 
family planning official scrutiny. 
 It has also been argued that a lot of the impact of the one child policy occurred 
early – between 1970 and 1979 – when the fertility rate fell from 5.9 to 2.9, largely 
because of  "late, long, few" campaigns. It has also been argued that the economics of 
the new middle class and the reduction of those living in serious poverty have become 
increasingly important in causing families themselves to limit the numbers of their 
children. 
 It is also true that a new sense of reality is worming its way into enforcement of 
the Household Registration Program.  Having failed to stem the tide of rural migration, 
it is increasingly necessary for the government to shift policy toward facilitating the 
absorption of urban migrants, and some cautious moves have been permitted.  In one 
example, it became obvious that huge numbers of the children of migrant parents were 
being deprived of basic education.  Under the Household Registration System, such 
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children were entitled to elementary and secondary education only in the village where 
their parents were born.  But in Shanghai now for example, children have been allowed 
to attend local primary and middle schools, but were not allowed to attend high 
schools.  In 2010, Shanghai had 390,000 migrant children under age six, and 570,000 
children age 15-19 who were not allowed to attend Shanghai high schools.  At that time, 
Shanghai had about 170,000 "official" resident children in high school, so the influx of 
the migrant children would have overwhelmed the whole system.    
 China now has an estimated 230 million migrant people, and for them, enforcing 
the one child policy is seriously dysfunctional.  The number of women of childbearing 
age in this migrant population is at an astonishing 67 million (2011), or about 25% of the 
national total, and 60% of those who have given birth have done so away from the place 
of their official household registration.  This means that they are not eligible for pre-
natal, delivery, post-natal or any other medical assistance at their urban location.  
Officials of large cities resent the fact that migrants are urgently pressing for greater 
access to social services of all kinds, since absorbing another 230 million customers is 
impossibly expensive and would clearly reduce the services available for the locals.  At 
the same time, migrants have become a vital and very cheap part of urban economies.  
Most urban areas are huge and have enormous industrial zones and informal 
economies, which is where the migrant workers earn their livings.  They provide cheap 
services for the newly emerging middle class.  Opinion polls tend to show acceptance 
levels for the population control program as high as 70%, but few of these polls seek out 
the views of the migrant underclass.  The "official" residents of urban areas tend to 
agree with the general policy of national population control because they recognize and 
benefit from the economic consequences of that policy. They are also fairly accepting of 
the one child policy because they recognize the world-wide trend for developed nations 
is naturally to produce fewer children per couple.  And yet, other polls repeatedly show 
that, among all women, more than 70% would like to have two or more children, with 
83% wanting both a son and a daughter.   
But the one child policy is heavily opposed in rural and village environments 
and has contributed mightily to the long term conflicts between the country and the 
city.  A large part of this resistance is not just about policy but about enforcement.  
During the 80's and 90's, the excessive zeal of politicians and family planning officials 
led to tens of thousands of horror stories about abuses, most of them not acknowledged 
by officials or reported in the media.  Abuses involved direct government intervention 
in the form of forced abortions, forced sterilizations, heavy fines, firings, beatings and 
even imprisonment. 
For a time in the late 90's and into the new century, the government seemed to be 
less harsh.  In 1983, it is estimated that there were 14 million abortions organized by 
family planning committees; by 2009, this number was down to 6 million. The 
government has been making minor but useful concessions on the margins of the main 
one child policy.  The CCP itself appeared to be tolerating some degree of debate over 
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such concessions and even over the basic question of the need for the policy at all.  
More recently, many jurisdictions have allowed more exceptions and waivers, and seem 
to have relied more on incentives or fines than the more draconian assaults on mothers.  
But by 2001, the CCP had strengthened its resolve and it issued Order # 63.  Regularly 
since then, the CCP has made it clear that the program is here to stay, at least until 2020, 
and perhaps forever.  BBC quoted the Communist Party official newspaper The 
People's Daily saying "We cannot just be content with the current success; we must 
make population control a permanent policy." (7) The rural population has never been 
fully reconciled to this aspect of government intervention, and over the years, there 
have been thousands of protests at many levels of intensity which the media has seldom 
reported, and the State Commission has seldom addressed. 
But perhaps the attitudes of the Chinese people if not those of the government, 
are changing after all.  Two conflicts stemming from the one child policy have seized 
world attention at last.  First, the blind rural rights activist Chen Guancheng made 
international headlines in 2005 precisely because he exposed a heavy handed campaign 
of forced abortions and sterilizations by family planning officials in eastern China. (8) 
For this sin, he was harassed, beaten and later imprisoned in what was clear to 
everybody as acts of vicious retaliation.  His escape from prison, refuge in the U. S 
Embassy in Beijing, and the later diplomatic negotiations that have allowed him to 
come to the U. S. placed the Chinese government in an extraordinarily bad light.  The 
CCP and the family planners sought to lay the blame entirely on the misconduct of local 
officials, but nobody believes that the national party was wholly innocent. 
Meanwhile, having learned nothing, family planners and CCP officials in the 
Guangxi Autonomous Region in southwest China launched a similar intensive 
campaign in 2007 to enforce stricter population control measures, including more 
forced abortions and sterilizations and other punishments against an outraged public. 
(9)  Officials precipitated the revolt by requiring mandatory health examinations for 
women, and forcing pregnant women with no official approval to be subjected 
immediately to forced abortions. The result was violent clashes between the police and 
local residents.  Rioters smashed up government offices, burned buildings, destroyed 
files and equipment and overturned official vehicles.  The riot police and the rioters 
fought each other in a series of confrontations lasting four days, and there were some 
reports of deaths but they could not be confirmed at the time. (10) 
Internet accounts report that officials had levied fines (officially termed "social 
maintenance fees") ranging from 500 yuan ($65) to 70,000 yuan ($9,000).  These fines 
were harshly punitive, and were applied as a new added tax for violations previously 
fined, back as early as 1980. Even worse, witnesses say that the police arrested and 
detained villagers, illegally searched homes, and confiscated (i.e. stole) anything 
valuable.  Thugs were hired by officials to attack the homes themselves, ripping off 
doors, breaking windows, and pounding holes in walls with hammers and heavy rods.  
And it should be noted that there are no legal appeals to the courts, since judges are not 
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independent but are civil service employees under the strict control of local CCP 
officials. 
 The average family in Hauaiji County in Guangdong Province has five or more 
children. (11) This is surely a lapse in the enforcement of the one child policy, but there 
were many ways in which the government could have acted.  The CCP and the family 
planning commission settled on a harsh, draconian proposal to force 20,000 abortions 
and sterilizations over the next six months in a county of less than one million citizens.  
It is deeply ironic that one technique employed by county officials consisted of buying 
expensive portable ultrasound equipment that could be transported to rural areas.  The 
use of ultrasound equipment is expressly declared illegal – by anybody – by Order # 63 
that established the one child policy in 2001.  In addition, ultrasound reveals the gender 
of the fetus, which is also illegal.  Using this equipment and other techniques, abortions 
for thousands of pregnant women were ordered on the spot, with no recourse.  Women 
were sent to Huaiji County hospital for surgery, and doctors were ordered to perform 
mandatory sterilization, even after approved pregnancies...  As a further outrage, the 
county financed most of the cost of the abortion program by cutting the salaries of 
poorly paid city workers. 
It seems likely that part of this peasant outrage stemmed from the long and 
dishonorable history of government corruption, illegal land seizures, low or unpaid 
wages, high taxes, excessive fees, lack of social services, and all of the other 
manifestations of an indifferent and inefficient government which seems to have 
deliberately left rural areas behind in China's urban based economic resurgence.  
 But the greatest threat of the population bomb stems from the remarkable aging 
of the Chinese population.  According to a report issued by China's National Committee 
on Aging (2007), China's 150 million population of over 60 million people is expected to 
grow to 240 million in 2020, and to a staggering 437 million in 2050.  Chinas population 
is expected to peak in about 2026 and then stabilize. At the time, the fertility rate, which 
was 2.6 in 1980, will be 1.56, which is too low to produce general population increase.  
The median age for Chinese by 2050 will be around 48 compared to about 35 now.  
During the same period, the ratio of workers to elderly will quadruple from 11 per 
thousand to 42. 
 The one child policy is closely linked to the new middle class.  Part of what is 
"new" is that this younger generation of single children is less willing to continue the 
long tradition in which the children accept responsibility for the care of their elderly 
parents. An only son now increasingly puts priority on enhancing the economic well 
being of his own family, and fewer are willing to face  up to the burdens of supporting 
two or three or more parents and even grandparents. 
 Where does this leave these elderly parents?  It is easy to assume that they will 
either buy old age insurance for themselves, or they will rely on social security pensions 
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from the government.  But these elderly lived in an era where huge numbers of them 
lived in life-long poverty, and few can possibly afford privately funded pensions.  And 
even worse, the CCP and governments at all levels have deliberately ignored the need 
to provide pension protection.  Only about 35% of people have any formal pension 
protection; this means that about 850 million Chinese have no access to pension 
protection at all. 
 Further, it is estimated that almost 50% of pension funds run by local 
governments are in the red, often because governments can't pay or refuse to pay 
legally mandated fund contributions.  And when pensions are actually paid, most of the 
amounts are pitifully inadequate. 
 How does the Chinese government find the funds and the professional 
competence and skill to expand its pension systems to cover an additional 850 million 
future retirees?  The answer is that it probably can't.  The new middle class is probably 
financially capable of taking care of themselves, but if they are not even willing (or able) 
to care for their own parents, they are not likely to want to pay huge tax increases to 
pay for the elderly poor.  Therein ticks the bomb. 
 
APPENDIX A 
Population and Family Planning Law of the People's Republic of China 
(Order of the President No. 63.) 
 The Population and Family Planning Law of the People's Republic of China, 
adopted at the 25th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's 
Congress of the People's Republic of China on December 29, 2001, are hereby 
promulgated and shall go into effect as of September 1, 2002. 
Jiang Zemin 
President of the People's Republic of China 
December 29, 2001 
 
Population and Family Planning Law of the People's Republic of China 
(Adopted at the 25th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's 
Congress on December 29, 2001. 
Contents 
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Chapter I General Provisions 
Chapter II Formulation and Implementation of Plans for Population Development 
Chapter III Regulation of Reproduction 
Chapter IV Rewards and Social Security 
Chapter V Technical Services for Family Planning 
Chapter VI Legal Liability 
Chapter VII Supplementary Provisions 
 
Chapter I 
Article 1 This law is enacted in accordance with the Constitution, for the purpose of 
bringing about a coordinated development between population on the one side and the 
economy, society, resources and environment on the other, promoting family planning, 
protecting the legitimate rights and interests of citizens, enhancing happiness of 
families, and contributing to prosperity of the nation and progress in society. 
Article 2 China being a populous country family planning is a fundamental State 
policy. 
The State adopts a comprehensive measure to control the size and raise the general 
quality of the population. 
The State relies on publicity and education, advances in sciences and technology, multi-
purpose services and the establishment and improvement of the reward and social 
security systems in carrying out the population and family planning programs. 
Article 3 The population and family planning programs shall be combined with the 
efforts to offer more opportunities for women to receive education and get employed, 
improve their health and elevate their status. 
Lawful performance of the official duties by administrative departments for family 
planning and their staff members shall be protected by law. 
Article 4 When promoting family planning, the people's governments at all levels and 
their staff members shall perform their administrative duties strictly in accordance with 
the law, and enforce the law in a civil manner, and they may not infringe upon 
legitimate rights and interests of citizens. 
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Lawful performance of the official duties by the administrative departments for family 
planning and their staff members shall be protected by law. 
Article 5 The State Council shall exercise leadership over the population and family 
planning programs throughout the country.  Local people's governments at all levels 
shall exercise leadership over the population and family planning programs within 
their administrative regions. 
Article 6 The administrative department for family planning under the State Council 
shall be in charge of the family planning program and the population program related 
to family planning nationwide. 
Family planning administration departments of the local people's governments at or 
above the county level shall be in charge of the family planning and the population 
program related program within their own administrative regions. 
The other administrative departments of the local people's governments at or above the 
county level shall be in charge of the relevant aspects of the population and family 
planning programs within the limits of their duties. 
Article 7 Public organizations such as Trade Unions, Communist Youth Leagues, 
Women's Federations, and Family Planning Associations, as well as enterprises, 
institutions, and individual citizens shall assist the people's governments in carrying 
out the population and family planning programs. 
Article 8 The State gives rewards to organizations and individuals that have scored 
outstanding achievements in the population program and family planning. 
Chapter II 
Formulation and Implementation of Population Development Plans 
Article 9 The State Council shall make plans for population development and 
incorporate them into the national economic and social development plans. 
Based on the plans for population development nationwide and such plans by the 
people's governments at or above the county level shall, in light of their local 
conditions, work out such plans for their own administrative regions and incorporate 
them into their economic and social development plans. 
Article 10 People's governments at or above the county level shall, on the basis of 
population development plans, formulate plans for implementation of the population 
and family planning programs and make arrangements for their implementation. 
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The administrative departments for family planning of the people's governments at or 
above the county level shall be responsible for routine implementation of the 
population and family planning plans. 
People's governments of townships, ethnic townships, and towns, and neighborhood 
offices in urban areas shall be in charge of the population and family planning 
programs in the areas under their jurisdiction and shall implement the population and 
family planning plans. 
Article 11 In the implementation plans for population and family planning programs 
shall be specified measures for keeping the size of the population under control, 
improving maternal and child healthcare and services, and raising the general quality 
of the population. 
Article 12 Villagers committees and residents committees shall, in accordance with law, 
make a success of the family planning programs in their own units. 
Government departments, the armed forces, public organizations, enterprises and 
institutions shall make a success of the family planning programs. 
Article 13 Departments in charge of family planning, education, science and 
technology, culture, public health, civil affairs, the press and publication, and radio and 
television broadcasting shall make arrangements to conduct public education in the 
importance of the population program and family planning. 
The mass media are obligated to give publicity to the population program and family 
planning for the public good. 
Schools shall, in a manner suited to the characteristics of the receivers and in a planned 
way, conduct among pupils education in the physiology and health, puberty and sexual 
health. 
Article 14 Family planning among migrant people shall jointly be managed by the 
people's governments of the place where their residence is registered and of the place 
where they are currently staying, but chiefly be the latter. 
Article 15 The State, on the basis of national economic and social development, 
gradually increases the overall amount of funding for the population and family 
planning programs. People's governments at all levels shall guarantee the necessary 
funding for such programs. 
People's governments at all levels shall give special support to the population and 
family planning programs in poverty-stricken areas and in areas inhabited by ethnic 
peoples. 
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The State encourages public organizations, enterprises and institutions and individuals 
to offer financial assistance to the population and family planning programs. 
No unit or individual may withhold, reduce or misappropriate the funds for the 
population and family planning programs. 
Article 16 The State encourages scientific research and international exchange and 
cooperation in respect of the population and family planning programs. 
Chapter III 
Regulation of Reproduction 
Article 17 Citizens have the right to reproduction as well as the obligation to practice 
family planning according to law.  Both husband and wife bear equal responsibility for 
family planning. 
Article 18 The State maintains its current policy for reproduction, encouraging late 
marriage and childbearing and advocating one child per couple.  When requirements 
specified by laws and regulations are met, plans for a second child, if requested, may be 
made.  Specific measures in this regard shall be formulated by the People's Congress or 
its Standing Committee of a province, autonomous region, or municipality directly 
under the Central Government. 
Family planning shall also be introduced to the ethnic people.  Specific measures in this 
regard shall be formulated by the people's congress or its standing committee of a 
province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government. 
Article 19 Family planning shall be practiced chiefly by means of contraception. 
The State creates conditions to ensure that individual citizens knowingly choose safe, 
effective and appropriate contraceptive methods.  Where birth control operations are 
performed, the recipient's safety shall be ensured. 
Article 20 Couples of reproductive age shall conscientiously adopt contraceptive 
methods and accept technical services specified by the State. 
Incidence of unwanted pregnancies shall be prevented and reduced. 
Article 21 Couples of reproductive age who practice family planning shall receive, free 
of charge, the basic items of technical services specified by the State. 
The funds needed for rendering the services in the preceding paragraph shall, in 
accordance with relevant State regulations, be listed in the budget or be guaranteed by 
social insurance plans. 
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Article 22 Discrimination against and maltreatment of women who give birth to baby 
girls or who suffer from infertility are prohibited.  Discrimination against, 
maltreatment, and abandonment of baby girls are prohibited. 
Chapter IV 
Rewards and Social Security 
Article 23 The State, in accordance with regulations, rewards couples who practice 
family planning. 
Article 24 To facilitate family planning, the State establishes and improves the social 
security system covering the basic old-age insurance, basic medical insurance, 
childbearing insurance, and welfare benefits. 
The State encourages insurance companies to offer insurance schemes that facilitate 
family planning. 
In rural areas where conditions permit, various types of old-age support schemes may 
be adopted in adherence to the principles of government guidance and willingness on 
the part of rural people. 
Article 25 Citizens who marry late and delay childbearing may be entitled to longer 
nuptial and maternity leaves or other welfare benefits. 
Article 26 In accordance with relevant State regulations, women may enjoy special 
occupational protection and be entitled to assistance and subsidies during the period of 
pregnancy, delivery, and breast feeding. 
Citizens who undergo surgical operation for family planning shall enjoy leaves as 
specified by the State. Local people's government may give them rewards. 
Article 27 The State shall issue to a couple who volunteer to have only one child in their 
lifetime a "Certificate of Honor for Single-Child Parents". 
Couples who are issued the said certificate shall enjoy rewards in accordance with the 
relevant regulations of the State and of the province, autonomous region, or 
municipality under the Central Government. 
When measures in laws rules or regulations specify that the rewards to couples who 
have only one child in their lifetime shall be given by the units where they work, such 
units shall execute the measures. 
Where the only child of a couple is disabled or killed in accidents, and the couple 
decides not to have or adopt another child, the local people's government shall provide 
the couple with necessary assistance. 
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Article 28  Local people's governments at all levels shall help rural households that 
practice family planning to develop economic undertakings by giving them support 
and preferential treatment in terms of funds, technology and training.  Poverty-stricken 
households that practice family planning shall be given priority in terms of poverty-
alleviation loans, relief through work and other poverty-alleviation projects and social 
assistance. 
Article 29 Specific measures for conferring rewards specified in this Chapter may be 
formulated by the people's congresses or their standing committees or the people's 
governments of the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the 
Central Government, or by larger cities in accordance with the provisions of this Law 
and relevant laws and administrative regulations in light of local conditions. 
Chapter V 
Technical Services for Family Planning 
Article 30 The State establishes premarital health care and maternal health care systems 
to prevent or reduce the incidence of birth defects and improve the health of newborns. 
Article 31 People's governments at all levels shall take measures to ensure citizen's 
access to technical services for family planning in order to improve their reproductive 
health. 
Article 32 Local people's governments at all levels shall rationally allocate and make 
multi-purpose use of health resources, establish and improve family planning technical 
service networks comprising family planning technical service institutions and medical 
and health care institutions providing such services and upgrade the facilities and 
improve the conditions for and raise the level of, such services. 
Article 33 Family planning technical services institutions and medical and health care 
institutions providing such services shall, within the scope of their respective 
responsibilities, conduct, among different reproductive age groups of people, publicity 
and education in the basic knowledge about the population program and family 
planning, provide pregnancy check-ups and follow-up for married women of 
reproductive age, offer advice and guidance and provide technical services in respect of 
family planning and reproductive health. 
Article 34 Persons providing family planning technical services shall give guidance to 
citizens who practice family planning in choosing safe, effective, and appropriate 
contraceptive methods. 
Couples who already have children are encouraged to choose long-acting contraceptive 
methods. 
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The State encourages research in, employment and wide use of, new technologies and 
contraceptives for family planning. 
Article 35 Use of ultrasonography or other techniques to identify fetal sex for non-
medical purposes is strictly prohibited.  Sex-selective pregnancy termination for non-
medical purposes is strictly prohibited. 
Chapter VI 
Legal Liability 
Article 36 Anyone who, in violation of the provisions of this Law, commits one of the 
following acts shall be instructed to make rectification and be given a disciplinary 
warning, and his unlawful gains shall be confiscated  by the administrative department 
for family planning and public health; if the unlawful gains exceed RMB 10,000 yuan, 
he shall be fined not less than two times but not more than six times the amount of the 
unlawful gains; if there are no unlawful gains or the said gains are less than 10,000 
yuan, he shall be fined not less than 10,000 yuan but not more than 30,000 yuan; if the 
circumstances are serious, his license shall be revoked by the authority that issued it; if a 
crime is constituted, he shall be investigated for criminal liability in accordance with 
law; 
 (1) illegally performing an operation related to family planning on another 
person; 
 (2) using ultrasonography or other techniques to identify fetal gender for non-
medical purposes or to bring sex-selective pregnancy termination for non-medical 
purposes for another person; or 
 (3) performing a fake birth-control operation, providing a false medical report, or 
issuing counterfeit certificate of family planning. 
Article 37 If anyone forges, alters or trades in certificated of family planning, his 
unlawful gains shall be confiscated by the administrative department for family 
planning; if the said gains exceed 5,000 yuan, he shall be fined not less than two times 
but not more than ten times the amount of said gains;; if there are no such gains or the 
gains are less than 5,000 yuan, he shall be fined not less than 5,000 yuan but not more 
than 20,000 yuan. If the offence constitutes a crime, he shall be investigated for criminal 
liability in accordance with the law. 
A certificate of family planning that is obtained by illegitimate means shall be revoked 
by the administrative department of family planning; if the fault lies with the unit that 
issues such a certificate, the persons who are directly in charge and the other persons 
who are directly responsible shall be given administrative sanctions in accordance with 
law. 
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Article 38 Persons providing technical services for family planning who serve against 
rules and regulations to delay rescue measures, diagnosis or treatment, if the 
consequences are serious, shall, in accordance with relevant laws and administrative 
regulations bear appropriate legal liability. 
Article 39 Any functionary of a State organ who commits one of the following acts in 
the work of family planning, if the act constitutes a crime, shall be investigated for 
criminal liability in accordance with law; if it does not constitute a crime, he shall be 
given administrative sanction in accordance with law; his unlawful gains, if any, shall 
be confiscated: 
 (1) infringing on a citizen's personal rights, property rights or other legitimate 
rights and interests. 
  (2) abusing his power, neglecting his duty or engaging in malpractices for 
personal gain; 
 (3) demanding or accepting bribes; 
 (4) withholding, reducing, misappropriating or embezzling funds for family 
planning, or fabricating, tampering with, or refusing to provide such data. 
Article 40 Any unit that, in violation of the provisions of this Law, fails to perform its 
obligation of assisting in the administration of family planning shall be instructed to 
make rectification and be criticized in a circular by the local people's government 
concerned; the persons who are directly in charge and the other persons who are 
directly responsible shall be given administrative sanctions in accordance with law. 
Citizens who fail to pay the full amount of the said fees payable within the specified 
time limit shall have to pay an additional surcharge each in accordance with relevant 
State regulations, counting from the date each fails to pay the fees; with regard to ones 
who still fail to make the payment, the administrative department for family planning 
that makes the decision on collection of the fees shall, in accordance with law, apply to 
the People's Court for enforcement. 
Article 41 Citizens who give birth to babies not in compliance with the provisions of 
Article 18 of this Law shall pay a social maintenance fee prescribed by law. 
Citizens who fail to pay the full amount of the said fees payable within the specified 
time limit shall have to pay an additional surcharge each in accordance with relevant 
State regulations, counting from the date each fails to pay the fees; with regard to ones 
who still fail to make the payment, the administrative department for family planning 
that makes the decision to collect the fees shall, in accordance with law, apply to the 
People's Court for enforcement. 
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Article 42 Where the person who should pay the social maintenance fees in accordance 
with the provisions prescribed in Article 41 of this Law is a State functionary, he shall, 
in addition, be given an administrative sanction in accordance with law; with regard to 
a person other than a State functionary, a disciplinary measure shall, in addition, be 
taken against him by the unit or organization where he belongs. 
Article 43 Anyone who resists or hinders the administrative department for family 
planning or its staff members in their performance of their official duties in accordance 
with law shall be subject to criticism and be stopped by the administrative department 
for family planning.  If his act constitutes a violation of the administrative regulations 
for public security he shall, in accordance with law, be given a penalty for the violation; 
if it constitutes a crime, he shall be investigated for criminal liability. 
Article 44 Citizens, legal persons or other organizations that believe an administrative 
department infringes upon their legitimate rights and interests while administering the 
family planning program may, in accordance with law, appeal for administrative 
review or initiate administrative proceedings. 
Chapter VII 
Supplementary Provisions 
Article 45 Specific measures for family planning among migrant persons and for 
providing to them family planning technical services, and measures for collecting social 
maintenance fees shall be formulated by the State Council. 
Article 46 Specific measures for implementing this Law by the Chinese People's 
Liberation Army shall be formulated by the Central Military Commission in accordance 
with this Law. 
Article 47 This law shall go into effect as of September 1, 2002. 
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